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Abstract
We report the experimental results on a game with an outside option where for-
ward induction contradicts with backward induction based on a focal, risk dominant
equilibrium. The latter procedure yields the equilibrium selected by Harsanyi and
Selten’s (1988) theory, which is hence here in contradiction with strategic stability
(Kohlberg-Mertens (1985)). We find the Harsanyi-Selten solution to be in much
better agreement with our data.
Since fairness and bounded rationality seem to matter we discuss whether recent
behavioral theories, in particular fairness theories and learning, might explain our
findings. The fairness theories by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) or Charness and Rabin (2002), when calibrated using experimental data on
dictator- and ultimatum games, indeed predict that forward induction should play
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no role for our experiment and that the outside option should be chosen by all
sufficiently selfish players. However, there is a multiplicity of “fairness equilibria”,
some of which seem to be rejected because they require too many levels of reasoning.
We show that learning theories based on naive priors could alternatively explain
our results, but not that of closely related experiments.
JEL classification: C92, C72, Keywords: experiments, equilibrium selection,
forward induction, fairness, level k reasoning.
1 Introduction
The multiplicity of Nash equilibria in many games has been a classic problem for game
theory. Many theories to refine among the equilibria have been proposed in order to reduce
the set solution candidates. A well known example is the theory of strategic stability by
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). An alternative approach is developed by Harsanyi and
Selten (1988) who provide an equilibrium selection theory that aims to select a unique
Nash equilibrium for every game. In this paper we discuss the results of an experiment
that was conducted over 20 years ago in order to test the behavioral validity of these two
theories in a game where they contradict. The experiment strongly refutes one of the
theories if it is applied to the one-shot game used in our experiment and if payoffs and
monetary incentives are identified. However, we always believed that elements of bounded
rationality were crucial for our results.
In the recent decade many different behavioral approaches to game theory and theories
of bounded rationality have been proposed. It is interesting to review our experimental
results and related ones in the light of these new theories. This, besides of the overdue
reporting of our experimental results, is the purpose of the current paper. We feel the task
to be rewarding because the analysis leads us naturally to discuss a variety of behavioral
concepts, in particular fairness theories, level k reasoning about the rationality of players,
and learning.
Our experiment is based on a version of a “Dalek”-game where the first player can
choose between an outside option and the possibility to play a 2×2-game.1 This 2×2-game
has a natural focal point equilibrium, an equal division which is also risk dominant. If
one accepts this focal point as the solution to the 2×2-subgame then backward induction
implies that player 1 should take the outside option. To solve the game in this way can
be justified by a strong backward induction principle, which requires that every solution
(although not necessarily every Nash equilibrium) to a subgame should be extendable to
1The term “Dalek-game” was coined by Binmore (1987), Binmore (1988). It refers to a certain visual
similarity between a graphic representation of the extensive form of the game and the tanks of the
extraterrestials called “Daleks” in the BBC science fiction series “Dr Who”.
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a solution to the whole game. Due to a related reasoning the theory by Harsanyi and
Selten (1988) also selects an equilibrium with this outcome.
In contrast, Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) discuss the strong backward induction prin-
ciple (see Property (BI2) in subsection 2.6 of their paper) but reject it in favor of an
alternative approach known as forward induction. The formalization of the forward in-
duction principle in van Damme (1989) motivated our experiment. He argues that the
presence of an outside option can make one of the equilibria in the 2 × 2-subgame focal
and hence determine how the subgame is to be played. Applied to our game his prin-
ciple implies that the outside option is not taken and that the play should result in an
unequal division which is favorable to player 1. This equilibrium is in fact selected by
many solution concepts based on the normal form representation of the game. Apart from
strategic stability, the iterated dominance of weekly dominated strategies or the concept
of strict equilibrium sets from evolutionary game theory (Balkenborg and Schlag (2007))
also select this solution.
Figure 1: The Dalek Game
This unequal division is, however, virtually not observed in our data and so the forward
induction outcome is refuted in favor of backward induction.
Substantial empirical evidence in the experimental literature often reject predictions
based on backward induction since it requires a too complicated reasoning or is in conflict
with fairness consideration. Moreover, standard game theory does not explain why we
obtain strong evidence against forward induction while other authors (e.g. Cooper, De-
Jong, Forsythe, and Ross (1993) and Brandts and Holt (1992)) get favorable evidence in
games which are game-theoretically virtually the same. Therefore we analyze our game
here in the light of alternative, descriptive theories that have been developed to explain
deviations from fully rational and selfish behavior. It is hard to deny (and not unintended
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by our design) that fairness considerations play a role in our experiment. We start hence
by applying the fairness theories by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) to our game. The important feature of these theories is that players can have vary-
ing degrees of fairness attitudes and this is reflected in their utility functions. Because
the fairness attitudes of players are unknown, one has to study a game of incomplete
information different from the original game. Under assumptions consistent with the ex-
perimental evidence from ultimatum games (see e.g. Kagel and Roth (1995), Camerer
(2003)) the “unfair” forward induction outcome is ruled out as a Bayesian equilibrium
outcome of the incomplete information fairness game. Nonetheless, the multiplicity prob-
lem of Nash equilibria is not resolved, which contrasts with most applications of fairness
theories discussed in the literature.
We find two types of perfect Bayesian equilibria for the incomplete information game.
One is a partially separating Bayesian equilibrium of the fairness model that is selected by
most refinement concepts and also by Harsanyi and Selten’s theory. It has the character-
istic that all sufficiently fair minded types of player 1 give up the outside option in order
to reach the fair outcome in the 2× 2-subgame. The other is a pooling equilibrium which
is less fair because in it all types of player 1 choose the outside option. The partially
separating equilibrium requires four steps of reasoning. Experimental evidence (see e.g.
Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006); Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008); Craw-
ford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri (2013); Nagel (1995); Stahl and Wilson (1995); Camerer
(2003), Chapter 5) suggests that already three steps demand too much of most subjects.
Not surprisingly, the pooling equilibrium fits better with our data. It should be a novelty
in the experimental literature that a fairer outcome does not arise because it requires too
many steps of reasoning. In previous experiments fairness equilibria tended to be cogni-
tively simple (see for instance Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and Rymon (2002) where subjects
apparently replace complex backward induction reasoning by simple fairness considera-
tion). Camerer and Fehr (2006) point out that theories based on the ”economic man”
may fail because economics agents may not be rational or because they may not be selfish.
In our experiment standard rationality (in the sense of backward induction) seems to be
restored because fairness and bounded rationality are themselves at conflict.
At this point one may argue that perhaps uncertainty about the behavior alone ex-
plains our results. If player 1 believes that player 2 takes his two choices with equal
probability then it is rational for him to take the outside option. While this argument
seems very convincing for our data, it does not explain why forward induction is so suc-
cessful in the data of Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1993) where the 2 × 2-game
is a symmetrical battle-of-the-sexes game with no focal point. We hence believe that
fairness matters for our results.
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Finally, Binmore and Samuelson (1999) argue that both equilibrium components for
the Dalek game are asymptotically stable for learning processes when an inward pointing
drift is added. Their considerations are important to explain the robustness of the out-
side option outcome in the long run. However, the theory does not discriminate between
the two equilibrium components of the original game, it simply explains why the forward
induction outcome does not necessarily arise from learning.2 One may still concede that
fairness consideration matter for the selection of the outside option equilibrium compo-
nent. Ironically, because their theory is agnostic on the question of whether players’
preferences are shaped by fairness considerations, one can combine their theory with the
recent fairness theories and obtain an argument why the “superfair” equilibrium of the
fairness models may not be learned.3
There is a large literature on experimental testing of the forward induction reasoning.
The common feature of most of these experiments is that there is a two-stage game. In the
first stage a player can typically choose an outside option, burn money or pay an entry fee.
In the second stage there is typically a symmetric conflict, which is a pure coordination
game or a battle of the sexes. Our game, in contrast, has non-symmetric components and
includes fairness outcomes in the game following the outside option. Ochs (1995) gives
a survey of the forward induction experimental literature. Many of the experiments he
mentions support the forward induction argument, see e.g. Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe,
and Ross (1992), Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1993) or van Huyck, Battalio, and
Beil (1993). In Cachon and Camerer (1999) outcomes are observed which are similar to
those in games where forward induction applies even if forward induction does not apply
in the game actually played.
However, there is also contrary evidence, similar to our experiment. Cooper, DeJong,
Forsythe, and Ross (1993) obtain the forward induction solution when it coincides with a
dominance argument but the same outcome is predicted when forward induction makes
no prediction. Brandts and Holt (1995) show that the forward induction is only a good
prediction, if it coincides with a simple dominance argument, but not without the domi-
nance story. In Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1993) and also in Huck and Mu¨ller
(2005) the forward induction solution predicts well in the experiment based on the ex-
tensive form but fairs poorly when subjects are presented with the normal form game.4
2Binmore and Samuelson (1999) do suggest that the size of the basin of attraction matters for which
equilibrium is selected. Unluckily the fair equilibrium in our experiment is also the one with the bigger
basin of attraction and so we cannot say what drives our result.
3Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) are Fehr and Schmidt (1999) are correspondingly agnostic about how
subjects reach equilibrium in their rather complex incomplete information games for which the calibration
of the priors is much in dispute.
4See also Huck and Mu¨ller (2005) for a more detailed summary on recent literature.
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A similar problem seems to arise in Caminati, Innocenti, and Ricciuti (2006) who use
games similar to ours but who work essentially with the normal form. Brandts, Cabrales,
and Charness (2007) find evidence against forward induction in an industrial organization
game.
Our description of the experiment and its result in Sections 2 – 4 will be brief. More
details can be found in the discussion paper Balkenborg (1994). The extensive game
we use in our experiment and the conflict between forward and backward induction is
further explained in Section 2. Section 3 describes our experimental design and Section
4 the results. In Section 5 we discuss the implications of behavioral theories for our
experiment. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Basic Game
Our experiment is based on the game in extensive form in Figure 2. It starts with a
random move selecting with equal probabilities between two subgames which we refer to
as the left and the right subgame.
Figure 2: The extensive game used in the experiment.
The right subgame will also be called the right bargaining game5 in the following be-
cause it can be interpreted as a simultaneous-move bargaining game. Players 1 and 2 must
decide simultaneously and independently between two possible agreements how to share
5This terminology was not used to explain the game to subjects in the experiment. We use it here to
gain some flexibility when discussing the experiment and its results.
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12 points. One of the two agreements (corresponding to outcome I, with both choosing
right) yields an equal division (6, 6) to both players. The other possible agreement (cor-
responding to outcome F, with both choosing left) is an unequal division yielding (9, 3),
9 points to player 1 and 3 to player 2. If both choose differently the game results in a
conflict and both players receive the conflict payoff 0 (outcomes G or H). Outcome G is
also called anticonflict because it results if both players make the proposal that is more
favorable to the opponent.6
The left subgame starts with a choice for player 1 to either end the game, and thus
takes his outside option (also called OUT) with payoffs (7, 4) or – by taking his right
choice (called IN) – to play a subgame that is identical (up to the embedding) to the right
bargaining game. The latter subgame will be referred to as the left bargaining game or the
bargaining game preceded by the outside option. Our bargaining game with outside option
is a variant of an example by van Damme (1989). van Damme discusses a symmetric
battle of the sexes game with two symmetrically unequal divisions (3, 1) and (1, 3) where
an outside option (2, 0) is added for player 1. Our bargaining game instead has an unequal
division (9, 3), an equal division (6, 6), which is a focal point in the bargaining game, and
an outside option yielding (7, 4). The payoffs in our game were chosen in such a way that
the two solution concepts discussed in the next subsection lead to two different outcomes
in the left subgame.
To compare how the presence of the outside option affects the play of the bargaining
game we introduced a random move which decides whether the outside option is available
to player 1 or not.
2.1 Normative solutions: Forward versus Backward induction
In this subsection we compare two normative solutions for the extensive game, backward
induction based on the focal point and forward induction. We assume here that the
payoffs at the terminal nodes are the true utilities of the players and that this is common
knowledge. Behavioral models modifying these assumptions are considered in Section 5.
The solutions we discuss are subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies.7 To
find all such equilibria, we must first select solutions to the left and the right bargaining
game. Each bargaining game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria, corresponding to
the two agreements. The solution selected for the left bargaining game determines via
backward induction whether a rational player 1 will choose his outside option or not.
6The first author heard the term “anticonflict” first in a talk given by Harsanyi. He compared anti-
conflict to the situation of two gentleman who want to pass a narrow entrance and each proposes to the
other “Please go first!”.
7To ease the discussion, mixed strategy equilibria are ignored in the following.
7
Thus we see that there are four subgame perfect Nash equilibria in the extensive game
overall.
Of these four only two are subgame consistent, namely those where the same agreement
is chosen for both bargaining games. Subgame consistency is based on the idea that a so-
lution concept must always induce identical solutions in identical subgames, regardless of
how they are imbedded, (see Harsanyi and Selten (1988) for a formalization). One could
argue that a solution concept based on backward induction should be both subgame per-
fect and subgame consistent, independently of how the subgames are embedded (compare
the discussion in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), section 2.3). Backward induction requires
to solve the subgames in isolation. Hence it seems natural so solve identical subgames in
the same way and then iteratively extend the solution found to the whole game.
The equal division (6, 6) seems to be a natural solution, a focal point for the bargaining
game in isolation (see also Subsection 5.2.2). A normative theory selecting this equilibrium
outcome is theory of risk dominance Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Since there is no conflict
between risk dominance and payoff dominance in this game, Harsanyi and Selten’s general
theory of equilibrium selection would choose this equilibrium as well.
If we accept the equal division as the only solution in both bargaining games, then
backward induction based on the focal point prescribes unique strategies for both players
in the extensive game of Figure 2. Both players must take their right choices in the two
bargaining subgames and player 1 must take his outside option in the left subgame, given
that 7 points for OUT is more than the 6 points player expects to receive in the bargaining
subgame. These strategies induce outcome A if nature selects the right subgame and
otherwise in outcome I. Because this solution is subgame consistent it can be shown to
be a solution according to Harsanyi and Selten (1988).8
Contradicting subgame consistency van Damme (1989) (and also Kohlberg and Mertens
(1986)) argue that the embedding of a subgame may be important for how it has to be
played. The presence of the outside option may affect how the bargaining game is played
and can make one of its two pure strategy equilibria focal.
The forward induction argument applies to the left subgame of our extensive game
as follows. It is never optimal for player 1 to move into the bargaining subgame and to
propose the equal division. He would thereby get either 6 or 0 while the outside option
yields him 7. Therefore player 2, when he observes that the bargaining subgame is reached
and he expects his opponent to act rationally, should conclude that player 1 intends to
propose the unequal division. He should hence agree to the unequal division, since 3
is better than 0. A rational player 1 should be able to follow this line of reasoning and
8Finding this solution requires only two essential steps of reasoning. Players have to accept the equal
division as the solution to the bargaining game and player 1 must decide on his outside option as the
consequence.
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anticipate that his opponent would propose the unequal division. Consequently, he should
play the bargaining subgame and propose the unequal division, getting 9.
Hence forward induction implies outcome B in the left subgame of Figure 2. It does not
contradict the choice of the focal point outcome I or the selection of any other equilibrium
in the right subgame.9
The forward induction outcome B arises most naturally from many normal form con-
cepts. It is the unique strict (hence evolutionary stable) equilibrium of the reduced normal
form of the left subgame, and also results from strategic stability and the iterated elimi-
nation of weakly dominated strategies.10
3 The Design of the Experiment
The experiment was conducted at the Bonn Laboratory of Experimental Economics in the
years 1989 and 1990. In total 154 students, mostly of economics and law, participated in 13
independent sessions which lasted, including instructions, between three and four hours.
With the exception of a one person, who participated in sessions 1 and 9, no participant
took part in more than one session. The extensive game was played between subjects via a
computer network. The subjects made their choices by selecting a move in the extensive
game as it was presented graphically to them on the computer screen. The extensive
game was presented in a style similar to the graph in Figure 2. A move was highlighted
by simultaneously highlighting all edges in the graph belonging to it. Computer programs
were developed for most of the instructions except for a last summary part, which was
always done verbally in a classroom. While the instructions made subjects familiar with
the extensive form, they did not see the actual payoffs of the game before the experiment
started. Similarly, we refrained from any interpretation of the game as a “bargaining
game with outside option”. We wanted the subjects to approach our extensive game like
a parlour game which often has highly abstract rules and can only be understood by
gaining experience through play. Thus our data reveal genuine learning and how subjects
9The contradiction between forward induction and subgame consistency is inherent. It is not due to
the selection of the focal point equilibrium in the bargaining game but to the fact that some selection
among the Nash equilibria was made for the bargaining game. Suppose, we would, for whatever reason,
consider (9, 3) as the only solution to the bargaining game. If we then replace the outside option for
player 1 by an outside option for player 2 with payoffs (2, 5) forward induction would select outcome
(6, 6) and not (9, 3).
10It is strictly dominated for player 1 to choose to play the bargaining game and to propose the equal
division in this game. If this strategy is eliminated, it becomes weakly dominated for player 2 to propose
the equal division. If this strategy is also excluded taking the outside option becomes weakly dominated
for player 1. Thus three levels of reasoning lead to the forward induction outcome B.
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familiarize themselves with the a new strategic conflict.11
Each session had twelve participants, except for session 10 which had nine, and sessions
11 and 13 which had each eleven participants. If the number of participants was even,
players were equally divided into players 1 and 2, maintaining these roles throughout the
session. In each period subjects in role 1 were randomly matched with subjects in role
2 and typically the basic game would be played simultaneously by six different pairs of
subjects. If the number of participants was odd, one randomly selected subject in role
one had to sit out.
Sessions differed by two main design features: 1. the information on the outcomes
of plays given after each period, as described further below, and 2. whether player 1 (in
sessions 9, 10, and 11) or player 2 (in all other sessions) moved first in both 2x2 bargaining
subgames. We could not find any significant differences between the treatments and hence
pool the data. “Virtual observability” does not seem to be an issue in our experiment.
This is in contrast to experimental results obtained in Rapoport (1997); Weber, Camerer,
and Knez (2004) and Muller and Sadanand (2003). The focality of one of the equilibria
seems to make the difference here.
Player 2 Player 1
Statistics 1 - 8 9
no Statistics 12, 13 10, 11
Figure 3: Variations of the experimental design in Sessions 1 - 13. In most, but not
all, sessions a summary statistics was given and player 2 moved first in the bargaining
subgames.
Each session consisted of two parts, using the strategy method Selten (1967):
In the first part the basic game was played strictly sequentially according to the game
tree in 50 rounds.12 In sessions 1 to 9 each player was informed after each round not only
about the outcome (i.e. the terminal node reached) in his own play, and the corresponding
payoff received, but also of the outcome in the other simultaneous plays by other pairs. A
subject not matched would still receive the information about the outcomes in all plays of
the period. We hoped to ease learning this way. Since all subjects could condition their
behavior on this public information, strategic behavior as familiar from the folk theorem
cannot be excluded. For this reason we conducted four further sessions, sessions 10 - 13,
11For a much more detailed description of the design see Balkenborg (1994).
12Between round 25 and round 26 there was a break in which they were offered a coffee and the
instructors made sure that there was no communication about the game
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were only the information on the own play was given. The computer did not provide
information on past plays. Instead subjects were given forms which allowed them to keep
track of all this information over time. However this was not enforced and often not done.
In the second part players had to select strategies; i.e., they had to select a choice
for each of their information sets in the game.1314 Once the strategy had been selected,
the subject had to confirm it and send it off. When all strategies of all subjects had
been submitted, the computer would evaluate each strategy of a subject in role 1 against
all strategies submitted by subject in role 2 (and a randomly selected move by nature).
A subject received the average payment from all the plays in which he participated. In
session 1 to 9 a subject was not only told at the end of a period which terminal nodes were
reached in his plays, but also how often each terminal node was reached in all (typically
36) plays in the period. Again, the latter information was not given in the last four
sessions.
At the end of the session each participant received in private his total gain in German
Marks with an exchange rate that varied between sessions subject to our budget con-
straint. In sessions 1 - 9 it varied between 0.09 and 0.11, yielding average payoffs about
35 DM ($23 at the time) for subjects in role 1 and 25 DM ($17) for subjects in role 2.
In sessions 10 to 12 the exchange was 0.14 and 0.16 in session 13 with correspondingly
higher average payoffs.
4 Results
In this section we discuss first the behavior in the main part of the experiment, in which
the game was played sequentially, and then the final part, where the subjects submitted
complete strategies. Unless stated otherwise, we use a sign test over all 13 independent
sessions at the significance level of 5% to test a 1-hypotheses of the form that number n is
higher than number m against the zero hypothesis that n is as often higher than m than
that it is lower. We also give average behavior over all sessions. We will mention if the
test does not yield significance for the first eight sessions alone where the treatments are
identical. As stated above, we pool over all 13 sessions since differences in the treatments
seem not to affect the results.
13Initially it was only vaguely announced that there would be a further brief second part. Instructions
were then given after the first part had concluded.
14There is now a large literature using this method of the second part for simple games, starting with
Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993). For a survey see Brandts and Charness (2011).
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4.1 Results for the main part
Table 12 and 13 show the frequencies with which each terminal node is reached in each
session and overall, pooled over all periods, for the left and for the right subgame.
We will first discuss the results for the right subgame, then for the left subgame fol-
lowed by a comparison of behavior between the two bargaining subgames. The subsection
concludes with the behavior over time.
4.1.1 The right subgame
The right bargaining game was selected by the chance move in 1817 (49%) out of a total
of 3700 plays of the basic game in all thirteen sessions.
Result 1 In the right subgame the focal outcome (E) with payoffs (6, 6) is reached overall
in 86%. In session 11 64% of plays resulted in this outcome. In all other sessions the
percentage is at least 80% (see Figure 4). A sign test rejects the hypothesis that the
outcomes F, G or H together are observed as often as the equal division outcome
I in favor of the hypotheses that I is observed more often (p ≤ 0.000244).
Note that the unequal division was only reached in 1% of all cases.
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Figure 4: For the right subgame the figure shows for each session how often the equal division
outcome (indicated by black bars, above) and the other outcomes (white bars, below) were
reached in absolute numbers in all plays of the subgame in all 50 rounds of the main part by all
pairs.
Result 2 Subject in role 1 chose “Left” more often than subjects in role 2 (11% versus
4%). As Figure 5 shows, this holds for all sessions but sessions 1 and 5, and is
significant (p ≤ 0.0225).15
15In session 1 players 2 propose “Left” 22 times. However, 16 were made by two subjects who obviously
did not understand the rules of the game or the handling of the keyboard. In session 5 both player types
choose “Left” with the same (low) frequency and therefore the focal outcome was reached in 96\%.
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Figure 5: Unequal division proposals in the right bargaining subgame by subjects in role 1
(white bars, left) and in role 2 (black bars, right), details as in Figure 4.
Overall we observe very little coordination failure in the right bargaining subgame.
Only very few subjects in role 1 try repeatedly to achieve the unequal division (see Balken-
borg (1994)).
4.1.2 The left subgame
In the last section we have seen that the focal point is chosen most often in the right
subgame with no outside option. Since subjects are confronted randomly with one of
the two subgames one could expect that if there is desire for fairness by both players
per se, the focal point is also reached in the left subgame. However, we see in the next
two sections that the outside option is chosen most often and attempts of entering the
2× 2-game and forgoing the outside option often results in a coordination failure.
Result 3 The outside option is observed in each session more often than any of the other
outcomes of this subgame together, on average with 88% (p ≤ 0.000244). In each
session this outcome was reached in at least 82% (see Figure 6).
The forward induction outcome is reached in less than 2% of all plays.
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Figure 6: Number of outside options outcomes (black bars, above), forward induction outcomes
(black bars, below, often zero) and other outcomes (white bars, below) for the right subgame,
details as in Figure 4.
The left bargaining subgame In particular, the left bargaining subgame is not
reached very often. Conditional on reaching it there is much less coordination than in the
right bargaining subgame. The unequal split (B) is reached in 13% and the equal split
(E) is reached in 38% of the cases. In nine session outcome E is reached more often than
outcome B, in two sessions less often and in two sessions equally often (p ≤ 0.0654).
Result 4 Subjects in role 2 chose “Right” (on average 82%) more often than “Left”
(p ≤ 0.00342). This holds in all but one session (see Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Equal division proposals (black bars, above) and unequal division proposals (white
bars, below) in the left bargaining subgame by subjects in role 2, details as in Figure 4.
In contrast, as shown in Figure 8, the behavior of subjects in role 1 in the left bargain-
ing subgame varies from session to session. Only very few subjects chose repeatedly to
play the left bargaining subgame (see Balkenborg (1994)). They predominantly proposed
the unequal division in six session and the equal division in four sessions. In three ses-
sions the numbers are equal. Counted over all session the unequal division was proposed
in 57%. Comparing the behavior of the two players we have:
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Figure 8: Equal division proposals (black bars, above) and unequal division proposals (white
bars, below) in the left bargaining subgame by subjects in role 1, details as in Figure 4.
Result 5 Subjects in role 1 chose “Left” more often than subjects in role 2 (128 times or
57% versus 40 times or 18%) (p ≤ 0.0386). This result does not hold in two sessions
and in one session no player chose left.
4.1.3 Comparison of play in the left and right subgame
Result 6 Subjects in role 1 try to reach the unequal division more often in the right
subgame by playing left than they try to reach it in the left subgame by forgoing
the outside option and then choosing left. Although the averages are close (11%
versus 7%) the result holds for 11 sessions and is significant (p ≤ 0.0225).
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Figure 9: Number of times subjects in role 1 used the forward induction strategy in the left
subgame (black bars, left) and number of times they proposed the unequal division in the right
subgame (white bars, right), details as in Figure 4.
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Comparison of play in the left and right bargaining subgame Our results so far
indicate that the behavior of subjects is consistent with the backward induction solution
and Harsanyi and Selten’s solution equilibrium theory. The next results show, however,
that behavior in the two bargaining subgames is markedly different and insofar contradicts
subgame consistency. One must keep in mind, of course, that the absolute frequencies for
the left bargaining subgame are very small.
Result 7 Subjects in role 1 tend to propose the unequal division more often (57%) in the
left bargaining subgame than in the right bargaining subgame (11%). This holds in
all but one session (p ≤ 0.00342).
Result 8 Subjects in role 2 tend to propose the unequal division more often (18%) in
the left bargaining subgame than in the right bargaining subgame (4%). This holds
in 10 sessions while in one session no role 2 player chose left (p ≤ 0.0386). However,
we do not get significance for the first eight sessions alone. But we do not get
significance for the first eight sessions alone. On the first 8 sessions a Wilcoxon test
yields a p-value of 7%.
Result 9 There is more miscoordination in the left bargaining subgame (49%) than in
the right bargaining subgame (14%). The fair outcome is reached less often in the
left than in the right bargaining subgame (38% versus 86%). Both results holds in
all but one session (p ≤ 0.00342).
It is not significant that the unequal division is reached more often in the left than
in the right bargaining subgame. The comparison of the averages (13% versus 1%) is
misleading here since there are several sessions without forward induction play.
4.1.4 Behavior over time
Aggregated over all sessions 74 pairs played the basic game in each round (10 sessions
with 6 pairs and 1 session with 4 pairs and 2 sessions with 5 pairs) per period. Figure
10 shows for each period how many of these plays resulted in outcomes different from
the (7,4) payoff in the left game and the (6,6) payoff in the right game. We see that in
the first period exactly 1/2 of all plays did not result in one of these outcomes with a
steep decline immediately after that period. After period 5 there are no more than 25%
atypical outcomes and after period 15 no more than 13.5%. From then on the picture looks
pretty stationary, centered around 5 atypical results per period. The picture is however
misleading insofar, as there are severe differences with respect to atypical behavior for
the different sessions in the later periods: A χ-test rejects at a 5% significance level the
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Figure 10: Number of plays that did not result in the outside option or the equal division in
the right subgame per period. The data are aggregated over all 13 sessions.
hypothesis that the data can be assumed to be in all sessions independently and identically
distributed in the second half of the main part of the experiment.16
4.2 The Final Part
In the five rounds of the final part of the experiment subjects had to hand in complete
strategies for the extensive game. Table 14 and 15 shows the frequencies of outcomes
for both subgames (parallel to tables 12 and 13). Tables 16 and tables 17 show the
strategies for each type of player, respectively.17 With respect to outcomes the aggregate
frequencies are surprisingly similar to the main part of the experiment, except that here
in the right bargaining subgame the outcome (9,3) is reached only in session 1. All results
we described in the previous subsections hold here with the exception that it is no longer
significant that subjects in role 1 tended to use the forward-induction strategy for the left
subgame less often than they chose to propose the unequal division in the right subgame.
16For various time ranges between period 20 and 50 we calculated how many “typical” outcomes (O
in the left subgame or E in the right subgame) and how many atypical outcomes where obtained in each
period and calculated the χ-statistic from these values. The lowest χ-statistic we found was for the time
range from period 25 to period 44, where the χ-statistic was 40.8.
17A strategy specifies a vector of three choices for player 1: 1. outside option In or Out, 2, L or R in
the left bargaining subgame, L or R in the right bargaining subgame. For player 2 it is a vector of two
choices for the left and right subgame, respectively.
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This similarity with the main part of the experiment implies that most players 1 choose
the outside option in the left game (89%) and both players choose right in the right game
(91% players 1 and 96% players 2). The highest frequencies for a single strategy of player
1 are ORR with 66%, followed by OLR with 17% and for player 2 are rr with 77%, followed
by lr with 19%. All other strategies are typically played with less than 10% in the single
sessions and less than 5% across all sessions.
In those sessions where some subjects in role 1 used the forward induction strategy
repeatedly in the main part of the experiment there is a visible effect on the behavior of
subjects in role 2 in the final part: The more the forward induction strategy was used in
the main part, the more often subjects in role 2 tended to propose the unequal division
in the final part. For each session we can look at the number of times subjects in role 1
chose the forward induction strategy in the main part relative to the number of times this
subgame was played. For the final part of each session we can look at the number of times
subjects in role 2 chose to propose the unequal division for the left bargaining game relative
to the number of strategies handed in. The Kendall rank correlation coefficient for these
two groups of numbers is τ = 0.63. Thus the ranks are positively correlated and a rank
correlation test yields a p-value of 0.13%. Consequently, the hypothesis that the ranks
are uncorrelated can be rejected. Still, the number of times subjects in role 2 proposed
the unequal division in the final part was never high enough to make it worthwhile for
subjects in role 1 to use the forward induction strategy.
5 Some behavioral theories to explain the results
Our data seem to clearly reject the forward induction solution in favor of backward in-
duction based on the focal point. Substantial empirical evidence in existing experimental
literature often reject, however, predictions based on backward induction since it requires
a too complicated reasoning or is in conflict with fairness consideration. Since fairness
considerations seem to matter for our results it is important to know what the recently de-
veloped descriptive theories of fairness imply for our games. Unless otherwise mentioned,
our discussion refers to the left subgame with the outside option.
5.1 Fairness theories, and level k reasoning
In the following we explore the implications of the fairness theories by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Charness and Rabin (2002) for our model.
All three fairness theories assume that players maximize utility (or “motivational”)
functions which depend not only on their own monetary gains but also on that of the
opponent. A player is assumed to perceive some additional disutility if the opponent gets
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more than he does or vice versa.18, 19 In all theories different “types” of a player have
different attitudes towards fairness and hence different utility functions. In the theory by
Charness and Rabin a player may perceive additional disutility if he accommodates “bad”
behavior of the opponent. The assumption that players can be of different types turns
the games studied into genuine games of incomplete information. In all theories a mild
equilibrium refinement concept (sequential equilibrium of perfect Bayesian equilibrium)
is used to determine a solution. In the games we study here, perfect Bayesian equilibria,
sequential equilibria, extensive form perfect Selten (1975) and normal form perfect equi-
libria all have the same outcomes. We will hence briefly speak of “fairness equilibrium”
when we refer to any such equilibrium in one of these incomplete information games with
fairness motivated players.
In order to calculate equilibria in the Bayesian games, priors over the types must be
given. Fehr and Schmidt provide bold calibrations for the distributions of types while
Bolton and Ockenfels largely abstain from such calibrations and assume only that all
relevant types have positive mass. We will need here one assumption on the distribution
of types which seems to be in agreement with many experimental data sets, in particular
on ultimatum games. This assumption is implied by the Fehr-Schmidt calibration and
consistent with the Bolton-Ockenfels model. Under this assumption the fairness models
considered here are dominance solvable and have only two Nash equilibrium components.
Below we will consider first dominance solvability, i.e., the iterated elimination of weakly
dominated strategies. Recall that the forward induction solution is obtained in three steps
by iteratively eliminating weakly dominated strategies.
Relevant for us is that all theories assume a certain fraction of subjects in the role of
player 2 to reject (9, 3) in favor of (0, 0). In the basic Charness-Rabin model, which is an
18More precisely, they behave as if they would perceive some disutility.
19Let x > 0 be the payoff of the player at a terminal node and let y > 0 be that of the opponent. Then
utility is in the Fehr-Schmidt model utility
u = x− αmax [0, y − x]− βmax [0, x− y]
where the parameter α describes how much one dislikes other having more (“negative inequality aversion”)
and β how much one dislikes others having less than oneself (“positive inequality aversion”). In the
Bolten-Ockenfels utility takes the form
u
(
x,
x
x+ y
)
where the utility function is increasing in the first argument and single peaked in the second argument
with a maximum at 1/2.Charness and Rabin extend the Fehr-Schmidt model by subtracting a further
term
...− γσmin [0, y − x]
with γ ≥ 0 where σ = 1 if the opponent behaved nasty and σ = 0 otherwise.
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extension of the Fehr-Schmidt model as far as the utility functions are concerned, the set of
types, for whom proposing the unequal division in the bargaining subgame is dominated,
can only be larger than in the Fehr-Schmidt model: Suppose a player 2 observes that
player 1 has chosen to play the bargaining subgame. Then there are two possibilities.
Either player 1 is a “nice person” who aims for the equal division. In this case player
2 should propose the equal division too. Or it is a player with nasty intentions heading
for the unequal division. In that case proposing the unequal division would give player
2 disutility because he would reward bad behavior. If this disutility, together with his
inequality aversion, is high enough he will propose the equal division even if it brings him
zero. Regardless of whether it is inequality aversion or the disutility from accommodating
bad behavior that motivates a type to reject (9, 3) in the ultimatum bargaining game, if
he does so in the ultimatum bargaining game, he should also reject (9, 3) in our game.
What fraction of the types of player 2 can be reasonably expected not to propose the
unequal division or to reject (9, 3) in an ultimatum game? Based on experimental results
in ultimatum games Fehr and Schmidt estimate the fraction to be 40-70%.20 Clearly, there
is much variance in the data and results change with details in the procedure. However,
any fraction above two ninth (or 22%) of these highly inequity averse types is enough for
the following argument.
5.1.1 Dominance solvability in the left subgame
We now show that the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads in four
steps to a unique fairness equilibrium which is a partially separating equilibrium. This
equilibrium is chosen by most refinement concepts discussed in the literature on signalling
games.
For those highly inequity averse types of player 2 who prefer (0, 0) in favor (9, 3) it
is a weakly dominated strategy to propose the unequal division.21 Once this strategy is
eliminated (step 1) for all these types (at least 22%), it becomes strictly dominated for
every type of player 1 to forgo the outside option and try to reach the unequal division.
He would gain less than 7
9
× 9 = 7 in expectation and therefore less than with the outside
option.
If IN and left is eliminated for all types of player 1 (step 2), it becomes weakly domi-
nated for all types of player 2 to propose the unequal division and thus this strategy can
be eliminated (step 3). Finally, (step 4) only those players 1 will enter the bargaining
20Our example is a knife-edge case for their calibration. They assume 30% of types to have the inequity
aversion parameter α = 0.5 and hence to be indifferent between (9, 3) and (0, 0), see Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), p. 844.
21For all such types it is a strictly dominated strategy to do so in the right subgame.
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game who are sufficiently fairness minded to prefer (6, 6) over (7, 4) while all other types
will take the outside option.
Proposition 1 Assume that there are more than two ninth of the types of player 2 for
whom proposing the unequal division is weakly dominated. Suppose that there is a positive
mass of types of player 1 who prefer (6,6) over (7,4). Then the fairness model based on
the bargaining game with outside option is dominance solvable in four steps. The solution
yields an isolated Nash equilibrium. It is partially separating for the types of player 1.
Sufficiently selfish types choose the outside option while sufficiently fairness minded types
choose to bargain and to propose the equal division. All types of player 2 propose the equal
division when the bargaining subgame is reached, which happens with positive probability.
The Nash equilibrium just described is perfect and strategically stable. Also Harsanyi
and Selten’s theory would select this equilibrium in the fairness model.
Conditional on the bargaining subgame being reached outcome E will be reached in
this equilibrium for sure. Based on experimental dictator game results (see the references
in Fehr and Schmidt (1999)) one might expect the fraction of positively “fair” players to be
around 20%, but we observe much less, around 5%. We do observe frequent fairness play
by some of the subjects only in three out of 13 experiments (namely in sessions 1, 7 and 8).
When a fairness player is around, the forward induction strategy is practically never used,
an observation which fits well with the equilibria just described. One could argue that this
equilibrium plays some role for these sessions. However, a sign test would reject in our
data the hypotheses that outcome E is reached with at least 70% of all times the subgame
is reached. Overall we would still conclude that the “hyperfair” equilibrium is not a good
description of the data. This is consistent with evidence from other experimental literature
(see Nagel (1995), Camerer (2003) which show that level 3 or 4 reasoning, as required
here for the equilibrium, are practically not observed, and Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and
Iriberri (2013)).
5.1.2 Further Nash equilibria in the left subgame
For the left subgame we only eliminated iteratively weakly dominated strategies and hence
other Nash equilibria then the one found can – and often do – exist. It is easy to see, by
following the chain of dominance arguments from above, that the only Nash equilibrium
of the fairness model where the bargaining subgame is reached with positive probability
is the partially separating equilibrium we have already encountered. Consequently the
only other type of equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium where all types of player 1 choose
the outside option.
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Proposition 2 Under the assumption of Proposition 1, there can exist further fairness
equilibria of the bargaining game with the outside option. In any of these equilibria the
outside option is taken with certainty.
This solution fits better with the data from our experiment.
Proof. To show existence of the perfect equilibria as described, consider trembles of
(the types of) player 1 where the subgame is reached with very small probability and then
the unequal division is proposed with a conditionally very high probability. All sufficiently
selfish types of player 2 will then propose the unequal division if the bargaining subgame
is reached. Provided this fraction is so high that even the most fairness-motivated type
of player 1 does not want to enter (here the details of the distribution and the type of
utility functions matter, extremely fairness minded types may have to be ruled out), we
have a perfect Nash equilibrium.
Concerning uniqueness, consider a Nash equilibrium where the bargaining subgame is
reached with positive probability. By assumption, there is at least a probability of two
ninth that player 2 will propose the equal division and so no type of player 1 is going to
enter and propose the unequal division. Thus all types of player 2 would have to propose
the equal division in a best reply. Correspondingly, a positive fraction of types of player 1
will enter. The equilibrium outcome obtained coincides with the dominance solution. The
only way to get a different type of equilibrium is by not having the bargaining subgame
reached, because then it can be rational for selfish types of player 2 to propose the unequal
division.
5.1.3 The right subgame
For the right subgame to be dominance solvable, we need a much stronger assumption on
the fairness attitude of player 2, which is, however, consistent with many experimental
data sets on the ultimatum game. A possible parallel assumption for player 1, that is
inconsistent with the data, leads to the same result.
Proposition 3 Suppose that more than 60% of types of player 2 or more than one third of
players 1 prefer (0, 0) over (9, 3). Then the fairness model based on the isolated bargaining
game has a unique rationalizable outcome and hence a unique Nash equilibrium outcome
which agrees with the equal division outcome and is reached with three steps of elimination
of strictly dominated strategies.
5.1.4 Fairness theories in other forward induction experiments
Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1993), Schotter, Weigelt, and Wilson (1994), Brandts
and Holt (1992), and Brandts and Holt (1995) report evidence on experiments with games
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where a battle-of-the-sexes-game is preceded by an outside option. They find mild evi-
dence in favor of forward induction, although the outside option is still taken with a high
probability. However, conditional on the battle-of-the-sexes game being played subjects
tend to play the equilibrium advantageous for the player with the outside option. The re-
sults strongly suggest that forward induction would fair better if we replaced the outcome
(6, 6) in our game with the outcome (3, 9). If true, this would contradict the predictions
of the fairness theories which do not depend on this change, since fairness oriented player
2 would favor (3, 9)over (9, 3).
Thus the focal point outcome - and hence fairness - seems to matter for our results,
although the fairness theories are rejected. Interestingly, a related phenomena arises in
the mini ultimatum games Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2003). When a proposer selects
the division (8, 2) favoring him out of the only two allowed divisions (8, 2) and (5, 5) ,
he is often rejected. He is rejected less often when he chooses the division (8, 2) out of
the only two allowed divisions (8, 2) and (2, 8) (see ). In the first, but not in the latter
case his behavior is regarded unfair. Thus intentions matter. Overall we observe that
we can use the fairness theories based on intentions by Charness and Rabin (2002) to
explain both our results and that of Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1993). The
extension of fairness theories is not only relevant for ultimatum games but equally for
forward induction experiments.
5.1.5 Fairness and Quantal Response
Even a fair player 1 will choose to bargain and propose the equal division in the left
subgame only, if he expects player 2 to choose right with a sufficiently high probability. In
quantal response equilibria (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), McKelvey and Palfrey (1998))
players make naturally errors. It is easy to see that if the error probability is sufficiently
high, even a fair player 1 will intend to stay out. Consequently there remain one fairness
equilibria remains, where all types of player 1, fair or selfish, choose the outside option.
5.2 Equilibrium selection based on level k reasoning and learn-
ing.
The following theories provide alternative explanations why forward induction might not
work in our experiment. We consider first a simple argument assuming level 1 reasoning
which leads immediately to the outside option outcome for the left subgame. For the
right subgame without the outside option we either need an argument assuming level 2
reasoning or the level 1 argument combined with a learning model. One may be tempted to
estimate, as has been done for many other games, learning models for our data. However,
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the task is not very insightful because most play is anyway in equilibrium and the few
deviations observed are caused by very few players (see Balkenborg (1994)). Hence we
abstain from it here.
5.2.1 Simple Priors
The following argument is in line with the arguments in Brandts and Holt (1993). We
consider the left bargaining game with the outside option. Suppose that both players
believe that if the bargaining subgame were reached the opponent would choose any of
his two strategies with equal probability. Suppose every player plays a best reply against
this belief, so there is level 1 reasoning. Then player 2 would expect payoff 1.5 by going
left and 3 by going right. He would hence choose right in the bargaining subgame. Player
1 would expect 3 from going into the subgame followed by playing right, 4.5 from going
into the subgame followed by playing left and 7 from taking his outside option. He would
hence take the outside option in a best reply. Thus we obtain immediately a subjective
equilibrium (in the sense of Fudenberg and Levine (1998)) where the outside option is
taken. As long as player 1 does not go into the subgame the beliefs of both players are not
questioned. If there are both level 1 types (who play right) and level 0 types (who mix
50-50) of player 2, player 1’s expectation that it is not worthwhile to play the subgame
would be confirmed if he would occasionally experiment and play it.
While the theory does explain our results, it would also lead to the outside option
outcome in the experiment by Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1993) and hence
contradict their result. It seems that fairness matters in our experiment, although in a
way which is not explained by the Fehr-Schmidt and Bolton-Ockenfels approach.
5.2.2 Risk dominance equilibrium
In the isolated bargaining game level 1 reasoning, in the sense that each player plays a best
reply against a naive, uniform prior, would not result in equilibrium play. However, a level
2 argument based on a uniform prior would lead to the risk-dominant equilibrium. We
present here a slightly simplified argument from Harsanyi and Selten (1988). The argu-
ment is easiest understood for a 2×2-bimatrix game as given below. Hereby the numbers
ai, bi (i = 1, 2) are assumed to be positive so that (Top, Left) and (Bottom, Right)
are the (only) pure strategy equilibria of the game. The equilibrium with the higher Nash
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product a1a2 or b1b2 is the risk dominant Nash equilibrium.
Left Right
a2 0
Top a1 0
0 b2
Bottom 0 b1
Figure 11: A 2× 2-game.
Player 1 plays a best reply against the expected strategy of his opponent. He believes that
his opponent plays a best reply against some belief and that all beliefs of his opponent are
equally likely. Each possible belief – and hence each “type” – of his opponent is described
by the probability 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 with which the opponent beliefs that player 1 is playing
Bottom. Thus player 1 beliefs that p is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. A rational player
2 will choose Left if he assigns probability p < a2
a2+b2
to his opponent playing Bottom
and he will choose Right if he assigns probability p > a2
a2+b2
to his opponent playing
Bottom. Given his uniform prior, player 1 therefore expects player 2 to play Left with
probability a2
a2+b2
and Right with probability b2
a2+b2
. Thus player 1 expects payoff a1a2
a2+b2
by playing Top and b1b2
a2+b2
by playing Bottom. He will play Top when a1a2 > b1b2 and
Bottom in the opposite case. A symmetric reasoning yields that player 2 will play Left
if a1a2 > b1b2 and Right in the opposite case. Thus both players choose in accordance
with the risk dominant equilibrium.
In our game, this level 2 process of reasoning leads to the equal division outcome.
The same analysis can be made in the game with the outside option, provided player
2 optimizes against conditional beliefs and player 1 assumes a uniform prior over these
conditional beliefs of his opponent. If player 1 would go into the 2× 2 subgame he would
expect payoff 3×9
3+6
= 3 from going left and 6×6
3+6
= 4 from going right. He would choose his
outside option. Player 2, assuming that makes both choices in the subgame with equal
probabilities, would choose right as before.
5.2.3 Learning
As we have discussed, playing best replies to a uniform level 1 prior leads for the left
subgame immediately to the prediction that player 1 will choose the outside option.
Simple learning models like fictitious play converge therefore in the first period. For
the right subgame on the right this is not the case. We show next, as an alternative
to the above level 2 argument, how fictitious play learning based on a naive prior leads
to convergence on the equal division outcome. We consider here fictitious play with a
Dirichlet prior (see Fudenberg and Levine (1998), Chapter 2) for the case where two
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players repeatedly play the right subgame. In period t ≥ 1 player i then plays a best
reply against the belief with which his opponent is assumed to propose the unequal or
equal division. It is given by the probabilities(
qtU,−i, q
t
E,−i
)
=
(
mU,−i + ntU,−i
mU,−i + ntU,−i +mE,−i + n
t
E,−i
,
mE,−i + ntE,−i
mU,−i + ntU,−i +mE,−i + n
t
E,−i
)
Hereby ntU,−i (respectively n
t
E,−i) is the number of times the opponent proposed the un-
equal (respectively equal) division in the past. mU,−i and mE,−i represent fictitious past
experience and describe the initial prior. These numbers are parameters of the model.
The larger they are, the less weight is put on actual experience. Once they are chosen,
the path of fictitious play is deterministically determined. Let us now consider a naive
prior, i.e. let
m = mU,1 = mE,1 = mU,2 = mE,2
Then player 1 will propose the unequal division and player 2 the equal division in a best
reply in the first period. If the opponent keeps proposing the equal division in the following
periods, player 1 will switch his strategy after m/2 periods because then proposing the
equal division becomes the best reply against the belief
(
qtU,−i, q
t
E,−i
)
=
(
m
2m+t
, m+t
2m+t
)
since
9m < 6 (m+ t) for t > m/2. If player 1 would keep proposing the unequal division, player
2 would switch to propose the unequal division later, after period m, because only then
3 (m+ t) > 6m holds. Thus, in all periods up to period m/2 player 1 would propose
the unequal division and player 2 the equal division. Thereafter player 1 would switch
to proposing the equal division, player 2 would no longer have to switch and play would
have converged on the equal division equilibrium. How long it takes to converge depends
on the parameter m in the model. For the left subgame fictitious play based on a naive
prior would converge immediately on the outside option, as we remarked above.
It is not difficult, although also not very insightful, to extend the above analysis to
the random-matching environment used in our experimental design.
The above explanations of our results are simple and appealing, but have some disad-
vantages. We already mentioned that the theory does not explain why there is convergence
to the forward induction solution in the experiments by Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and
Ross (1993) and Brandts and Holt (1992). Moreover, rote models of learning cannot easily
explain why no convergence occurs or why convergence is much slower when the games
are presented in normal form or similar (see Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1993),
Huck and Mu¨ller (2005), Caminati, Innocenti, and Ricciuti (2006)). Cognitive aspects,
e.g. whether an outcome can be regarded as focal or as a suitable compromise, seem
relevant for how quickly one observes convergence to an equilibrium, if at all.
In contrast to these simple deterministic models, learning models with randomness
and experimentation will typically converge to the forward induction outcome in the very
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long run because it is the unique strict equilibrium of the reduced normal form of the
left subgame. Binmore and Samuelson (1999) argue, however, that both equilibrium
components for the Dalek game are asymptotically stable for learning processes if an
inward pointing drift is added. We believe that their considerations are important to
explain the robustness of the outside option outcome in the long run but do not fully
explain the speedy convergence we observe in our experiment in the short run.
6 Conclusions
We conducted an experiment where a forward induction hypothesis was clearly rejected
in favor of backward induction based on a simple focal point, provided that the games
are analyzed as one-shot games and that payoffs and monetary incentives are identified.
Subjects had no difficulty to coordinate on the risk-dominant, equal division equilibrium
in the 2× 2 bargaining subgame. However, on a finer level we find differences in the play
of the bargaining subgames with or without outside option, which are not in line with
subgame consistency.
As Binmore, Proulx, Samuelson, and Swierzbinski (2001) summarize our finding:
“The risks associated with a hard bargaining that is required to achieve an
efficient outcome are avoided by inefficiently opting out.”
Since there is some evidence for forward induction in other experiments for very simi-
lar games, we considered two behavioral approaches to explain the observations. One was
learning based on naive priors which leads to the observed behavior in the long run. How-
ever, the less structured results when similar games are played in normal form (Cooper,
DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1993), Muller and Sadanand (2003)) suggest that the result
is not due to pure rote learning alone. We expect cognitive considerations, in particular
whether subjects regard an outcome as fair or not, to matter as well. For this reason
we studied what the recent fairness theories of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) (and also Charness and Rabin (2002)) tell us about our game.
These fairness theories rely conservatively on traditional game theoretic assumptions,
in particular full sequential rationality, but use motivational or utility functions which are
in better agreement with experimental observations. The use of incomplete information
models allows to take account of subject heterogeneity. The approach used in the fairness
theories has the advantage that one can draw conclusions from experimental results on
dictator and ultimatum games for other types of games. For our outside option game
the approach leads to the prediction that player 1 should predominantly take the outside
option, as is observed in our experiment.
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One disadvantage of the approach is that it does not, at least currently, model the
cognitive limitations of subjects (see Binmore, McCarthy, Ponti, Samuelson, and Shaked
(2002)). In our case the fairness model has one game theoretically very appealing equilib-
rium, a partially separating equilibrium, which is cognitively even more complex than the
forward induction equilibrium of the original game. It requires level 4 reasoning, which
is typically not observed in the experimental literature. To play this equilibrium subjects
must understand that only very fairness minded types of player 1 will enter the bargaining
subgame with the intention to coordinate on the equal division outcome. It should be
a novelty that a “fair” equilibrium is not played because it is cognitively more complex
than a simple backward induction equilibrium. Arguably, standard rationality is restored
because fairness considerations are cognitively too complex.
Our application of the fairness models rests on the assumption that a sufficiently
large proportion of players would reject a split (9, 3) disadvantageous for them in favor
of zero for both players, regardless of the context in which this decision is embedded.
As one of the inventors of the fairness theories himself observed (see Falk, Fehr, and
Fischbacher (2003)), this assumption is already violated in simple mini-ultimatum games.
It is interesting to see that the same difficulty arises for forward induction experiments,
when one compares our results with those of Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1993).
In this paper we took an experiment designed to test equilibrium refinement or se-
lection theories and discussed its results it the light of new behavioral theories. We feel
that the discussion led to new insights and raised new questions on the interplay between
coordination, fairness, learning and level k reasoning, which future research will need to
address.
A Appendix
The following pages summarize the essential data from the experiment. For the main part
in each session they show in Tables 12 and 13 how often the left and the right subgame
(ΓL and ΓR) and each of their terminal nodes, as labelled in Figure 2, were reached in
all plays of the game by any pair in the fifty rounds. A session with 12 subjects would
thus have 300 plays. The numbers in brackets give the frequency relative to the number
of times the relevant subgame was reached, i.e. it is the fraction calculated by dividing
number before the bracket by the number in the last column. In the last column we
aggregate the absolute frequencies and calculate relative frequencies again by dividing by
the last column. We did not average average frequencies.
Tables 14 and 15 are constructed similarly for the final part, by evaluating all plays for
all strategies of subjects in role 1 against all strategies of subjects in role 2 for each of the
28
five final periods. In a session with 12 subjects there would be 5 × 36 = 180 such plays.
The strategies themselves chosen by the subjects in role 1 and 2 are given in the last two
tables. O and I indicate “out” and “in”. Choices for the left subgame are given first.
The strategy ORL would, for instance, be the strategy of player 1 where he would choose
the outside option in the left subgame, propose the equal division in the left bargaining
subgame and the unequal division in the right bargaining subgame. In IRL he chooses
to play the bargaining subgame.
In those session where the order of play in the bargaining subgames was interchanged
the data are adjusted in the natural way.
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Ses A B C D E ΓL
(outside (forward (anti (conflict) (equal
option) induction) conflict) division)
1 135 ( 89%) 1 ( 1%) 4 ( 3%) 2 ( 1%) 10 ( 7%) 152
2 127 ( 89%) 2 ( 1%) 0 ( 0%) 12 ( 8%) 2 ( 1%) 143
3 147 ( 89%) 0 ( 0%) 1 ( 1%) 13 ( 8%) 4 ( 2%) 165
4 127 ( 83%) 5 ( 3%) 3 ( 2%) 9 ( 6%) 9 ( 6%) 153
5 137 ( 96%) 0 ( 0%) 1 ( 1%) 1 ( 1%) 4 ( 3%) 143
6 138 ( 90%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 13 ( 8%) 3 ( 2%) 154
7 138 ( 88%) 0 ( 0%) 1 ( 1%) 2 ( 1%) 16 ( 10%) 157
8 130 ( 84%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 25 ( 16%) 155
9 135 ( 87%) 4 ( 3%) 0 ( 0%) 15 ( 10%) 1 ( 1%) 155
10 88 ( 93%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 4 ( 4%) 3 ( 3%) 95
11 111 ( 82%) 13 ( 10%) 0 ( 0%) 12 ( 9%) 0 ( 0%) 136
12 132 ( 89%) 3 ( 2%) 0 ( 0%) 11 ( 7%) 3 ( 2%) 149
13 114 ( 90%) 1 ( 1%) 1 ( 1%) 5 ( 4%) 5 ( 4%) 126
Σ 1659 ( 88%) 29 ( 2%) 11 ( 1%) 99 ( 5%) 85 ( 5%) 1883
Table 12: Main Part: Outcomes in the Left Subgame
Ses F G H I ΓR
(unequal (anti (conflict) (equal
division) conflict) division)
1 2 ( 1%) 20 ( 14%) 12 ( 8%) 114 ( 77%) 148
2 3 ( 2%) 1 ( 1%) 24 ( 15%) 129 ( 82%) 157
3 0 ( 0%) 2 ( 1%) 19 ( 14%) 114 ( 84%) 135
4 2 ( 1%) 3 ( 2%) 8 ( 5%) 134 ( 91%) 147
5 0 ( 0%) 3 ( 2%) 3 ( 2%) 151 ( 96%) 157
6 1 ( 1%) 7 ( 5%) 21 ( 14%) 117 ( 80%) 146
7 1 ( 1%) 2 ( 1%) 7 ( 5%) 133 ( 93%) 143
8 1 ( 1%) 0 ( 0%) 13 ( 9%) 131 ( 90%) 145
9 4 ( 3%) 5 ( 3%) 18 ( 12%) 118 ( 81%) 145
10 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 12 ( 11%) 93 ( 89%) 105
11 7 ( 6%) 10 ( 9%) 24 ( 21%) 73 ( 64%) 114
12 1 ( 1%) 1 ( 1%) 9 ( 6%) 140 ( 93%) 151
13 1 ( 1%) 2 ( 2%) 14 ( 11%) 107 ( 86%) 124
Σ 23 ( 1%) 56 ( 3%) 184 ( 10%) 1554 ( 86%) 1817
Table 13: Main Part: Outcomes in the Right Subgame
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Ses A B C D E ΓL
(outside (forward (anti (conflict) (equal
option) induction) conflict) division)
1 81 ( 98%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 2 ( 2%) 0 ( 0%) 83
2 57 ( 70%) 6 ( 7%) 1 ( 1%) 13 ( 16%) 4 ( 5%) 81
3 81 ( 93%) 1 ( 1%) 1 ( 1%) 3 ( 3%) 2 ( 1%) 87
4 86 ( 96%) 1 ( 1%) 0 ( 0%) 3 ( 3%) 0 ( 0%) 90
5 88 ( 99%) 1 ( 1%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 89
6 99 ( 94%) 1 ( 1%) 0 ( 0%) 5 ( 5%) 0 ( 0%) 105
7 73 ( 88%) 0 ( 0%) 3 ( 4%) 0 ( 0%) 7 ( 8%) 83
8 79 ( 83%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 2 ( 2%) 14 ( 15%) 95
9 75 ( 74%) 5 ( 5%) 1 ( 1%) 18 ( 18%) 2 ( 2%) 101
10 49 ( 92%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 4 ( 8%) 53
11 71 ( 83%) 4 ( 5%) 2 ( 2%) 4 ( 5%) 5 ( 6%) 86
12 86 ( 93%) 1 ( 1%) 0 ( 0%) 3 ( 3%) 2 ( 2%) 92
13 73 ( 82%) 0 ( 0%) 2 ( 2%) 7 ( 8%) 7 ( 8%) 89
Σ 998 ( 88%) 20 ( 2%) 10 ( 1%) 60 ( 5%) 46 ( 4%) 1134
Table 14: Final Part: Outcomes in the Left Subgame
Ses F G H I ΓR
(unequal (anti (conflict) (equal
division) conflict) division)
1 3 ( 3%) 24 ( 25%) 12 ( 12%) 58 ( 60%) 97
2 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 18 ( 18%) 81 ( 82%) 99
3 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 18 ( 19%) 75 ( 81%) 93
4 0 ( 0%) 4 ( 4%) 2 ( 2%) 84 ( 93%) 90
5 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 6 ( 7%) 85 ( 93%) 91
6 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 1 ( 1%) 74 ( 99%) 75
7 0 ( 0%) 6 ( 6%) 1 ( 1%) 90 ( 93%) 97
8 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 85 (100%) 85
9 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 4 ( 5%) 75 ( 95%) 79
10 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 7 ( 15%) 40 ( 85%) 47
11 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 64 (100%) 64
12 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 3 ( 3%) 85 ( 97%) 88
13 0 ( 0%) 5 ( 8%) 6 ( 10%) 50 ( 82%) 61
Σ 3 ( 0%) 39 ( 4%) 78 ( 7%) 946 ( 89%) 1066
Table 15: Final Part: Outcomes in the Right Subgame
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Ses OLL OLR ORL ORR ILL ILR IRL IRR Sum
1 5 (17%) 2 ( 7%) 1 (3%) 21 (70%) 0 ( 0%) 1 ( 3%) 0 (0%) 0 ( 0%) 30
2 1 ( 3%) 4 (13%) 0 (0%) 17 (57%) 5 (17%) 1 ( 3%) 0 (0%) 2 ( 7%) 30
3 2 ( 7%) 6 (20%) 2 (7%) 18 (60%) 1 ( 3%) 0 ( 0%) 1 (3%) 0 ( 0%) 30
4 0 ( 0%) 5 (17%) 0 (0%) 24 (80%) 1 ( 3%) 0 ( 0%) 0 (0%) 0 ( 0%) 30
5 1 ( 3%) 1 ( 3%) 0 (0%) 27 (90%) 1 ( 3%) 0 ( 0%) 0 (0%) 0 ( 0%) 30
6 0 ( 0%) 8 (27%) 1 (3%) 19 (63%) 0 ( 0%) 2 ( 7%) 0 (0%) 0 ( 0%) 30
7 1 ( 3%) 4 (13%) 0 (0%) 22 (73%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 0 (0%) 3 (10%) 30
8 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 0 (0%) 25 (83%) 0 ( 0%) 1 ( 3%) 0 (0%) 4 (13%) 30
9 1 ( 3%) 7 (23%) 0 (0%) 13 (43%) 1 ( 3%) 7 (23%) 0 (0%) 1 ( 3%) 30
10 3 (12%) 1 ( 4%) 0 (0%) 19 (76%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 0 (0%) 2 ( 8%) 25
11 0 ( 0%) 11 (37%) 0 (0%) 15 (50%) 0 ( 0%) 2 ( 7%) 0 (0%) 2 ( 7%) 30
12 1 ( 3%) 8 (27%) 1 (3%) 18 (60%) 0 ( 0%) 1 ( 3%) 0 (0%) 1 ( 3%) 30
13 0 ( 0%) 7 (23%) 1 (3%) 17 (57%) 1 ( 3%) 1 ( 3%) 1 (3%) 2 ( 7%) 30
Σ 15 ( 4%) 64 (17%) 6 ( 2%) 255 (66%) 10 ( 3%) 16 ( 4%) 2 (1%) 17 ( 4%) 385
Table 16: Final Part: Strategy Choices of Subjects in Role 1
Ses ll lr rl rr Sum
1 6 ( 20%) 0 ( 0%) 2 ( 7%) 22 ( 73%) 30
2 0 ( 0%) 11 ( 37%) 0 ( 0%) 19 ( 63%) 30
3 0 ( 0%) 12 ( 40%) 0 ( 0%) 18 ( 60%) 30
4 1 ( 3%) 10 ( 33%) 1 ( 3%) 18 ( 60%) 30
5 0 ( 0%) 3 ( 10%) 0 ( 0%) 27 ( 90%) 30
6 0 ( 0%) 4 ( 13%) 0 ( 0%) 26 ( 87%) 30
7 1 ( 3%) 2 ( 7%) 1 ( 3%) 26 ( 87%) 30
8 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 30 (100%) 30
9 0 ( 0%) 10 ( 33%) 0 ( 0%) 20 ( 67%) 30
10 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) 20 (100%) 20
11 0 ( 0%) 10 ( 40%) 0 ( 0%) 15 ( 60%) 25
12 0 ( 0%) 8 ( 27%) 0 ( 0%) 22 ( 73%) 30
13 2 ( 8%) 1 ( 4%) 0 ( 0%) 22 ( 88%) 25
Σ 10 ( 3%) 71 ( 19%) 4 ( 1%) 285 ( 77%) 370
Table 17: Final Part: Strategy Choices of Subjects in Role 2
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